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Abstract 
 
The I/N case offers insight into the interrelationship between work systems, 
living standards and performance. It demonstrates that a high road approach 
and functional work systems positively impact stakeholders’ lives, improve 
production efficiency and benefit the local and macro-level economies and 
societies in which they are embedded. It also shows that such work systems can 
be implemented in contexts with a history of adversarial labor-management 
relations. However, broader external forces can conspire to make it very 
difficult for firms to sustain functional work systems despite initial successes in 
specific contexts. Financial markets in particular make long term commitment 
to stakeholder groups other than shareholders (i.e. employees, suppliers and 
communities) conditional on profit maximization and share price appreciation. 
Yet the logic of profit maximization for the benefit of shareholders leads to 
short termist decisions that undermine the very commitments that were so 
necessary for creating a new work system: security is threatened, training is put 
on the back burner; trust is irreparably undermined. Indeed, because of the 
inherent contradiction between strategic approaches to maximizing stock 
market and long term product market success, these high road systems are 
fragile in national frameworks that subject them to low road pressures without a 
forum for resolving the difficulties that arise from opposing market pressures 
and responses. 
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THE FRAGILITY OF FUNCTIONAL WORK SYSTEMS IN 
AMERICAN STEEL 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The U.S. steel industry has experienced profound change during the 
past three decades. Shifting market and technology conditions and 
public policies have provided both opportunities and constraints that 
have shaped and re-shaped the environment in which steel producers 
operate and to which they must respond. In the United States, 
pressures from intensified domestic and international competition, 
rapid and labor-saving technological advances, market deregulation 
and increasing globalization of corporate steel assets have put even 
the most competitive domestically based steel producers under 
mounting pressure to continually cut costs and increase efficiency. As 
a result, American steel producers have increasingly sought alliances 
with foreign steel firms because of the performance benefits 
associated with access to foreign technology and financial resources, 
global steel sourcing and distribution channels, and expanded market 
share. 
 
It is within the context of an increasingly global steel industry that the 
nature of the firm’s work system as a strategy for strengthening 
performance has attracted attention in academia and in industry. There 
is now widespread agreement that cooperation among productive 
agents, and the implementation of high performance or functional 
work systems1 substantively benefits product quality, production 
efficiency, financial returns and organizational responsiveness 
(Wilkinson 1998; Konzelmann and Birecree 1998; Konzelmann 1996; 
Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Delaney, Ichniowski and Lewin 1988; 
Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986). “Functional” work systems 
embody cooperative labor relations and innovative work structures, 
management methods and human resource practices. They positively 
impact the firm’s long run viability by empowering productive agents 
with control over the production and decision-making processes that 
affect their working lives. They also benefit the broader economic 
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system by providing stable employment and incomes and relatively 
high levels of general and specific training. In contrast, dysfunctional 
work systems feature traditional management and human resources 
practices, relatively adversarial labor relations, little employment and 
income security, and minimal emphasis on training. 
 
Despite the long-term competitive advantages attributed to them, 
functional work systems may be difficult to sustain in the U.S. 
Although there are cases where such systems have been successfully 
implemented in the short run, they remain vulnerable in the medium 
run (five to ten years), particularly in cases where external or 
corporate-level pressures and strategic choices subordinate local to 
corporate-level interests. Given the easily measured costs of such 
systems, the difficulty of measuring the long run benefits, and the 
importance of sustained commitment to employees in the form of 
increased training, security and autonomy, these new work cultures 
are fragile in the U.S. environment. U.S. financial markets reward 
managers and decision-makers for focusing on short-term profitability 
in the interest of shareholders; and managers who do not boost share 
price eventually face replacement or takeovers. These management 
disruptions and ownership changes can quickly lead to reversion to 
more traditional approaches to labor relations and work organization. 
Key work system components (i.e. employment security, innovative 
incentive plans, training, and other investments in hard-to-measure 
intangibles) are often viewed by new decision-makers/owners as 
unnecessarily expensive and/or vague. Changes of this nature at the 
strategic decision making level undermine morale and trust among 
employees, contributing to the work system’s eventual deterioration 
back into a more dysfunctional form. 
 
This paper analyzes the experience of a highly successful work 
system in the American steel industry that survived and flourished in 
the 1990’s, but is currently under stress from the changes that have 
resulted from the corporate buy-out of its American parent. I/N Tek / 
I/N Kote (I/N) are highly efficient and profitable greenfield steel 
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processing plants that were jointly financed and built (1987-1990) by 
American-owned Inland Steel Company and Japanese-owned Nippon 
Steel Corporation. Despite profitable performance, in 1998, in a 
quickly negotiated sale, Inland Steel Company sold itself (and its 
ownership share in I/N) to ISPAT International, a Dutch-owned 
global steel conglomerate. The buy-out came as a surprise to many of 
the firm’s stakeholders, including Nippon Steel and employees at I/N. 
The resulting change in ownership and management objectives is now 
putting the I/N work system under significant stress, and threatening 
the high labor standards and quality of life it has supported. 
 
Section one surveys the literature on functional work systems and 
their interrelationship with firm performance. Section two analyzes 
three phases in I/N’s history: pre-start-up and start-up; the attempt to 
sustain, improve and draw lessons from its initially functional work 
system; and subsequent responses to pressures for change generated 
by the 1998 ownership shift to ISPAT. Using the productive systems 
framework for analysis (Wilkinson, 1998; Wilkinson, 1983), it traces 
the inter-linkages between the technical and social relations of 
production and the impacts of strategic responses to pressures 
operating on the productive system. Section three draws conclusions 
from the previous discussion and highlights the policy implications 
that emerge from the analysis. 
 
2. Functional Work Systems 
 
During the past two decades, inspired by the apparent success of 
Japanese work and production systems, many U.S. firms have been 
experimenting with new forms of work organization. These work 
system experiments typically involve some combination of quality 
circles, employee participation in decision-making (both on- and off- 
line), teamwork, continuous improvement, training, employment 
security, flattening of hierarchy, and gain or profit sharing schemes. In 
the American industrial relations and management literature, most 
studies find that new workplace techniques (often referred to as “high 
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performance work practices”) generate substantive productivity and 
quality gains for manufacturers implementing them (Appelbaum and 
Batt, 1994; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson, and Straus, 1996; 
lchniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997; Black and Lynch, 1998; 
Pfeffer, 1998). Additionally, studies focusing explicitly on financial 
returns have found that new work systems generate results that are 
equal or superior to those associated with more traditional work 
systems (Huselid, 1995; Baker, 1999). 
 
Given empirical evidence of their relative efficiency, one would 
expect these new workplace techniques to quickly dominate in 
American firms. However, radical and sustained organizational 
transformation is challenging in the U.S. context. Even those firms 
that succeed in planning and implementing functional work systems 
find that sustaining them over the longer term is difficult. To date, 
studies suggest that diffusion of these practices is slower and less 
extensive than one would expect, and the medium and long-run 
survival of even the most promising new workplace techniques is far 
from guaranteed (Osterman 1994; Pfeffer 1996; Doeringer, 
EvansKlock, and Terkla 1998). 
 
To explain this slow diffusion, fragility, and variation in success (and 
failure) rates of new workplace practices, research formerly restricted 
to workplace innovation is broadening its scope. Many studies now 
suggest that systemic reform of the entire employee relations system, 
rather than implementation of new work place practices alone, is 
critical. Mutual cooperation and trust among managers and employees 
are considered necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful 
systemic reform and institutionalization of the work system, and the 
importance of how - rather than whether - change is implemented is a 
recurrent theme in the literature (Cooke 1989; Ichniowski et al. 1996; 
Birecree and Konzelmann 1997; Wagar 1997; Lopez et al. 1997; 
Pfeffer 1998). Many studies also find that unions increase the 
likelihood that functional work systems will be efficient and long 
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lasting because they help to ensure substantive employee authority in 
any change process (Black and Lynch 1997).  
 
The institutional context in which a firm attempts reform is also 
important because systemic workplace reform does not occur in 
vacuum; the firm’s broader institutional environment profoundly 
affects the process (Levine and Tyson 1990; Brown and Reich 1997). 
Capital, product and labor markets play a significant role in either 
shaping and encouraging or discouraging reform internal to the firm. 
It is therefore significant that in the United States, many new 
workplace techniques are imported pieces of models developed in 
other institutional contexts. 
 
Appelbaum and Batt (1994) argue that U.S. managers approach the 
transformation of work in an ad hoc manner because national 
institutions do not support functional work systems: 
 
"Managers in the U.S. turn to consultants and come under the 
influence of one guru or another. Thus, U.S. companies often 
import pieces of production models, sociotechnical systems, 
lean production, diversity quality production, or flexible 
specialization, that were developed in other institutional 
contexts. Such models may be implemented successfully in one 
or another company without the support of external institutions, 
but it takes a leadership dedicated to change and a very large 
commitment of financial and other corporate resources to make 
widespread organizational change possible." (p. 157) 
 
Without external support, firms must independently determine the best 
way to transform their work-place environment. Because functional 
work systems are expensive in the short run and require sustained 
effort, commitment, and training of everyone involved, their success 
is often dependent on particular personalities with an expressed 
commitment to such approaches. In short, the absence of an external 
institutional imperative that socializes some of the costs of functional 
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work systems means that it may not be profitable in the short run for 
firms to introduce and/ or to maintain more efficient modes of work.  
 
The U.S. financial environment is particularly short termist. American 
managers and strategic decision-makers are under intense pressure to 
cut costs in the short run for the benefit of largely absentee 
shareholders. Therefore, instead of encouraging or being indifferent to 
the nature of the firm’s work system, the U.S. financial system 
operates as a constraint on the diffusion and maintenance of 
functional work practices. By rewarding short run profitability, it 
undermines the ability of shareholders to act as patient investors, 
willing to see expensive projects through. It reduces the ability of 
managers to invest in research and development, new process 
technology, and training required for new work practices to be 
effective; and it can undermine the ability of firms to undertake long 
term employment contracts with hourly and managerial employees 
(Lazonick 1992). It also facilitates rapid, often unexpected changes in 
ownership without concern for other stakeholders’ approval, leading 
to erosion of trust and morale among employees. Pfeffer (1996) 
explains:  
 
"The power of the capital markets and institutional investors 
now virtually dictates that firms focus on financial issues. 
Unfortunately, the quickest way for a firm to raise its stock 
price, at least in the comparatively short term, is by announcing 
layoffs. Thus, financially oriented firms have little reason to be 
very sensitive to high performance work practices. 
 
The financial viewpoint sees other negatives. High performance 
work practices require major up-front investments: training, 
more selective (and hence more expensive) recruiting, perhaps 
higher wages, and so forth. The payoff from these investments is 
obviously uncertain and, in any event, follows with considerable 
lag. Risk aversion would lead many managers to eschew a 
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performance improvement strategy with this much uncertainty 
and delay. 
 
The positive effects on profits from cutting costs are visible on 
the typical spreadsheet program. Not so gains in quality and 
productivity emerging from an interrelated set of changes in 
how people are managed. Moreover, typical organizational 
accounting systems enter training, wages, and expenditures on 
organizational change efforts as expenses-without 
corresponding returns that can be measured by typical means. 
The temptation to cut these costs under the least financial 
stringency is almost overwhelming." (Pfeffer 1996: p 34) 
 
Faced with these kinds of pressures, it is easy to understand why firms 
find it very difficult to implement and sustain functional work systems 
in the U.S. context.  
 
Significantly, however, certain organizations based in the U.S. have 
managed to implement functional work systems that have survived for 
at least the short run. As these organizations attempt to maintain the 
successes of initial workplace reform during the medium and longer 
term, many important questions arise that are not yet adequately 
addressed in the literature. Among these are the following:  
 
1) How do these organizations implement and then attempt to 
institutionalize functional work systems in the U.S.?  
2) To what extent and how do organizations manage to 
insulate themselves from their external environment?  
3) What kinds of pressures are these organizations really 
subject to?  
4) How do they perform when the system comes under 
significant external stress?  
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To investigate these questions, longitudinal case studies of small and 
medium sized organizations at the plant level within particular 
industries are needed. As such, the case of I/N is instructive. 
 
3. Description of the Case 
 
3.1. Industry context: the American steel industry 
 
Since the 1970s, the American steel industry has experienced a series 
of economic and industry crises; and its responses have generated 
substantial changes in industry and firm-level institutional and 
organizational structures. The uncontested world leader during the 
first half of this century, the United States is currently the third largest 
steel producing country, behind the People’s Republic of China and 
Japan, each of which produces approximately 100 million tons of 
crude steel per year. 
 
Traditionally, the American integrated steel producers2 operated as an 
oligopoly, with domestic market control and unmatched economic and 
technological strength in world markets. In 1950, almost half of the 
world’s steel was produced in the United States, compared with 12 
percent in 1997 (AISI, various years). Contributing to this success 
was the superiority of U.S. steel production and productivity in world 
markets in a context of steadily increasing demand for steel. Since that 
time, however, declining demand for integrated steel products in an 
environment of intensifying competition from domestic and foreign 
steel producers has eroded the relative position of the U.S. steel 
oligopoly. By the late 1970s, American steel firms found themselves 
in an increasingly difficult economic and financial position, resulting 
in low operating rates, large financial losses, bankruptcies, massive 
plant closures and employment reductions. 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, American steel firms reacted in a variety 
of ways to the crisis. Some, like U.S. Steel Corporation, diversified 
corporate assets outside of the steel industry; others, like Bethlehem 
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Steel Corporation, focused corporate attention on domestic steel 
production activities; still others, like National Steel Corporation and 
Inland Steel Company, entered into joint ventures and joint ownership 
arrangements with foreign steel producers. As a whole, the American 
steel industry eliminated more than 40 million tons of capacity (40 %) 
during the 1980s and reduced employment by more than 250,000 
employees (60 %) (AISI, various years). By the 1990s, the structure of 
the American steel industry had changed. The integrated steel sector 
had lost approximately one third of its share of domestic steel 
production to the mini-mill sector while imports rose from one percent 
of domestic steel supply in 1950 to 25 percent in 1997 (AISI, various 
years). 
 
By the mid 1990s, after two decades of restructuring, American steel 
producers were again among the world’s most productive, recording 
solid profits from 1994 onward. Because of the industry’s relative 
maturity and its poor overall performance during the 1980s and early 
1990s, however, steel stock prices remained depressed in one of the 
strongest stock markets in history. This put pressure on domestic steel 
producers to find ways to bolster stock market performance. The 
dominant response has been consolidation, mergers and acquisitions 
by which steel companies are becoming global productive systems. 
Globalization is accelerating cost competition in the industry as firms 
secure access to international sourcing and distribution channels 
permitting minimization of raw materials, production and distribution 
costs while at the same time dramatically expanding market share. In 
order to effectively compete in the global steel industry of the late 
1990s, American steel companies have also been segmenting 
operations within the firm itself. Inland Steel Company provides a 
good example.  
 
3.2. Corporate context: Inland Steel Company 
 
In many respects, Inland Steel Company was a success story. Created 
in 1893, Inland soon gained a reputation for being among the best 
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managed and technologically sophisticated of the major US steel 
companies. The fourth largest US steel producer, its financial 
performance historically exceeded that of the rest of the industry, with 
annual sales in excess of $2 billion (1.25 billion pounds). 
 
In 1982, when the US steel industry was in deep crisis, Inland 
recorded its first economic losses in fifty years; and like many other 
US steel producers, its first response was to cut costs, reduce capacity, 
layoff people and delay capital expenditures. Despite these efforts, 
Inland continued to suffer extreme financial difficulties, recording 
losses of $178.4 million (111.5 million pounds) in 1985. It was in this 
context that a new CEO, Frank Luerssen, took over and the company 
began to explore alternatives for corporate restructuring and for 
revitalizing productive operations. In 1984 and 1985, Inland sold off 
its non-steel assets, laid off thousands of employees and redirected 
production to the higher profit, high quality carbon steel segments of 
the market. 
 
The results of these efforts ultimately gave rise to the diversity which 
now characterizes the company in the form of three operating 
divisions: The Inland Steel Flat Products Company, The Inland Steel 
Bar Company and I/N Tek and I/N Kote (I/N). The Inland Steel flat 
Products Company and the Inland Steel Bar Company are both 
located at the Indiana Harbor Works. They are separate business units 
but share the same USWA union local and management as well as an 
historical legacy of oligopoly company structure and behavior; rigid 
and fragmented internal labor market structures; and adversarial 
relationships between labor and management. The Inland Steel Flat 
Products Company is a modified, but largely traditional steel making 
facility. The Inland Steel Bar Company represents an effort to depart 
from tradition and create a hybrid facility which resembles a 
progressive mini-mill or specialty steel making facility within the 
walls of an integrated steelworks.  
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In sharp contrast to the other two divisions, the I/N facility is located 
in New Carlisle, IN. A joint venture between Inland and Japan’s 
Nippon Steel Corporation, it is an autonomous, state-of-the-art 
greenfield steel processing plant. I/N has its own USWA local union 
and radically different organizational and internal labor market 
structures than its parent, although both management and the core 
labor force were transferred directly from the Indiana Harbor Works. 
Unique in its achievement of a progressive internal labor market 
system, the I/N case is instructive for purposes of understanding the 
creation and the attempt at institutionalization of a functional work 
system in a small organization which is tightly linked to a large steel 
corporation in the U.S. It is also interesting because it now must 
respond to the stresses of a corporate buy-out and radical change in 
corporate-level strategic and managerial decision-making processes. 
Its responses and the outcomes associated with this process will be 
important indicators of the ability of functional work systems to 
survive in the context of the unregulated U.S. economic, financial and 
industrial system. Appendix I provides further information about the 
Indiana Harbor Works Facilities. The I/N case is described below.  
 
3.3. The new Carlisle facility: I/N Tek / I/N Kote 
 
3.3.1. Planning and startup 
 
I/N Tek was born out of corporate performance difficulties and 
Luersson’s determination to turn Inland around. During the early 
1980s, Inland Steel Company announced plans to explore the 
possibility of constructing a cold-rolling steel processing facility. In 
1983, Luersson consulted with Japanese-owned Nippon Steel 
Corporation, the world’s largest steel-maker, whose Hirohata facility 
added a new continuous cold mill in 1982, produced steel coils of 
extraordinary dimensions, surface quality and drawability, at a speed 
matched by no other plant in the world. The Hirohata plant was able 
to produce in one hour what could be produced in no less than twelve 
days at the Indiana Harbor Works. Inland decided to try to transplant 
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this technology to its facilities in the U.S. However, Inland’s poor 
corporate performance in a context of industry crisis translated into 
insufficient internal funding and difficulties in obtaining domestic 
financing. The venture therefore depended on partnership with 
another company. 
 
In the spring of 1985, Luerssen approached Nippon and proposed 
forming a joint venture using the Japanese technology employed at 
the Hirohata facility. Initially not interested, by summer, Nippon faced 
over-capacity in the Japanese domestic steel market and pressure from 
Japanese automobile transplants in the United states that were unable 
to obtain steel of requisite quality in the United States. Importing steel 
from Japan was both expensive and difficult; and it was exacerbating 
trade tensions between the two countries. Nippon therefore became 
interested in a joint venture that would allow it to produce steel in the 
United States, thereby avoiding trade restrictions and tensions. 
Because Nippon had maintained a long, informal relationship with 
Inland, and respected Inland’s corporate commitment to the steel 
industry, it made sense for the two companies to collaborate. In the 
end, Nippon agreed to arrange project financing that would not appear 
on Inland’s balance sheet, and to accept the Tek joint venture facility 
as collateral for the debt. The bulk of the initial I/N Tek cost ($525 
million (328.125 million pounds)) was provided by three Japanese 
trading companies. In 1987, the agreement to build Tek (a 60% 
Inland/ 40% Nippon joint venture) was signed; and the mill was on-
line by 1989. The agreement to build Kote (a 50% Inland / 50% 
Nippon) was signed in 1989; and the mill was ready for production in 
1991. Nippon also became the largest shareholder of Inland in the 
early 1990s, representing a 13 percent stake in the firm.  
 
3.3.2. The technical relations of production 
 
Tek is a cold rolling mill with an annual capacity of 1 million tons 
which processes hot band steel coil produced at the Indiana Harbor 
Works. It serves customers in the automobile, appliance and office 
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furniture industries, most of whom are located in the mid-western 
United States. Modeled after the Hirohata facility in Japan, Tek’s 
technology involves a continuous cold rolling process which 
integrates previously discontinuous batch processes (requiring 
approximately 12 days from start to finish) into a continuous flow 
process that takes less than 20 minutes per coil. Hot band produced at 
the Indiana Harbor Works is transported to Tek on railroad flat cars 
on a just-in-time basis (two days’ supply is stored at the I/N facility on 
railroad flat cars). Coils are unloaded directly into the plant, unrolled 
and welded to the preceding coil. In a continuous process, the coil is 
prepared for cold reduction (pickled or de-scaled) before entering the 
continuous annealing process line (CAPL). It is then subject to 
processing in the skin pass mill before being inspected, sheared and 
recoiled. After this, automatic guided vehicles transport the coils for 
final finishing, wrapping and deposit in Tek’s automatic storage and 
retrieval facility for truck or rail delivery to the customer. 
 
Kote operates electrolytic and hot dipped galvanizing lines. It 
galvanizes and coats steel supplied by Tek as well as fully annealed 
coils supplied by the Indiana Harbor Works. With an annual capacity 
of 900,000 tons, Kote supplies customers almost exclusively in the 
automobile industry, its major customers are the Japanese automobile 
transplants and GM, Ford and Chrysler. Coils enter one of two 
continuous hot dip zinc coating lines. After galvanizing, coils are 
inspected, side trimmed, packaged and transferred to Kote’s automatic 
retrieval facility by automatic guided vehicles. 
 
At both Tek and Kote, the production process technology is entirely 
computer controlled. Employees are especially critical when there are 
problems. According to I/N President, John Selky,  
 
“The automation technology provides for the operation to run 
absolutely wonderfully when everything is going well. 
However, workers and their special skills are key when 
something does not go the way you want it to go. The operators 
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and maintenance personnel work together to proactively avoid 
problems. But when things go wrong, teamwork, training and 
employee authority to make decisions on the line are critical for 
getting the line quickly running again’ (personal interview, 4 
December, 1998). 
 
When things go wrong, teamwork, training, and employee authority to 
make decisions on the line are critical for getting the line quickly 
running again.  
 
Because of the nature of the new, continuous process technology at 
I/N, workers are responsible for the entire process of production. 
Compared with I/N’s predecessor in the Indiana Harbor Works, they 
therefore required new and different skills, greater job flexibility, and 
the willingness and ability to assume responsibility for both 
production and maintenance functions. This represented a radical 
departure from the traditional steel industry labor market system 
which typically reduced the task composition of various jobs into their 
narrowest component parts and assigned control over the labor and 
production process to management (see Appendix 2). 
 
3.3.3. The social relations of production  
 
While Tek and Kote share location, top management and union 
representation, prior to the 1998 ISPAT buy-out, each plant had its 
own vice president of operations, manager of technology and 
engineering; and Tek also had managers of sales and administration. 
Nippon supplied to Tek and Kote the vice president of operations and 
manager of technology; and to Kote the managers of sales 
administration and of customer service. Because Inland supplied the 
steel that was finished at I/N, Nippon also provided a quality control 
person at the Indiana Harbor Works to assure that the steel supplied to 
I/N was of the necessary quality. Besides the vice presidents and 
managers, Tek had a team of four Nippon engineers while Kote had 
ten Japanese technical personnel. All other employees were American. 
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The decision to locate the I/N facility in New Carlisle, Indiana, rather 
than at Indiana Harbor works, represented the first step in an effort to 
create a culture at the plant that was very different from the traditional 
steel industry culture. However, both management and workers were 
hired from a pool of employees that had worked at Indiana Harbor. 
I/N therefore represents a case where workers and managers from a 
brown-field site, with a traditional “Taylorist” work system, were 
imported to a new, green-field site, which by design would employ a 
highly participatory and non-adversarial work system. 
 
3.3.3.1. Selection and hiring 
 
Whereas Inland Steel had an elaborate seniority and skill based 
bidding system, the selection process at Tek and Kote was based on 
cooperation. According to Human Resource representatives, “We 
didn’t want Rambo types, even if they were super qualified and could 
run the world by themselves” (Magnum, Kim and Tallman, 1996). 
The applicant pool came from all areas of the Indiana Harbor Works, 
including the blast furnace, coke oven, open hearth and other 
departments. It also included New Carlisle locals without prior 
experience working in the steel industry. 
 
The hiring process for the early workforce members was conducted by 
an outside consultant and an I/N management team. Later, as 
additional employees were required, bargaining unit members were 
included in the decision-making process. Displaced Inland employees 
were urged to apply but were not given any ‘special’ considerationn; 
and everyone was required to go through the same selection process if 
they were interested in working in the new facility. Job applicants 
were subjected to a battery of tests conducted by the State of Indiana, 
including general aptitude tests and motivation tests, and a role 
playing exercise to assess their capacity for working in groups and 
being flexible. Each candidate was then interviewed by three separate 
interviewers who focused on strengths and weaknesses that were 
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revealed in the previous steps of the selection process. Out of the 
initial pool of over 1200 applicants, approximately 135 were 
successful. Of those final 135 applicants, 120 opted to accept the 
position.  
 
The final 120 employees proved to be not just from the cold mill 
shutting down at Inland, but from many different plants at the Harbor 
Works. This in itself represents a departure from traditional hiring 
practices; in the past, most employees would have come from the 
former cold mill. Employees were also varied in age and experience, 
and seniority played a relatively minor role in determining who was 
selected. Because the union was satisfied that the Harbor Works 
employees were getting the first chance at the jobs in New Carlisle, 
they allowed more latitude for who out of the pool would be hired. 
The union also saw the logic of hiring locally for unskilled positions 
at the plant. 
 
3.3.3.2. Pre-production training 
 
During the year prior to start-up, I/N emplyed many unorthodox 
methods in order to encourage a smooth start-up. Production and 
maintenance workers and managers were put on salaried payroll and 
over 80 percent were sent to Japan. The objective was to provide 
technical training on the equipment and to allow I/N employees to see 
that the continuous process technology being installed in New Carlisle 
worked well in Japan. It also provided I/N employees with insight into 
the cooperative relationship between management and labor at the 
Hirohata Works (Tek) and at the Nagoya Works (Kote) and into 
aspects of the Japanese work culture (including the performance 
based bonus system, which is shared by all plant employees, the work 
structure, and the long-term view of the production relationship). 
Following this training in Japan, a training team from the Hirohata 
and Nagoya Works spent six months at Tek and Kote, respectively, to 
continue the technology training through the initial start-up phases of 
operation. While technical training was critical it was also necessary 
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to have all employees participate in the ‘new work culture’ training 
that was begun as soon as employees joined the company and 
continued informally for three to five years. 
 
3.3.3.3. Employment security 
 
Employment security is another key component of the I/N work 
system, guaranteed for the core organized labor force (the operators 
and craft maintenance workers). Protected employees could be 
bumped down to perform lower level material handler jobs, but 
without loss in pay from their previous positions. Employment 
security was particularly important for supporting the creation of the 
I/N work system in an industry context with a legacy of layoffs and 
increasingly unstable employment relations. It reduces risks 
associated with a participative labor market system and improves 
possibilities for labor/management cooperation, teamwork, and 
flexible job behavior. It also demonstrates the company’s commitment 
to its organized labor force. It is important to note, however, that 
while explicit employment security is provided to the majority of 
bargaining unit employees, it is not guaranteed for white-collar 
employees. Therefore, as long as the system performs to expectations, 
all employees are secure.  
 
3.3.3.4. Work organization and culture 
 
At I/N, teamwork, shared responsibility, broadly defined jobs and few 
job classifications characterize the organization of work. Unrestricted 
promotion is combined with employment security for the core labor 
force. Workers are cross-trained, multi-skilled, multi-craft workers. 
Although assigned a skill-based classification, operators normally 
perform preventive and corrective maintenance on the equipment they 
operate; and craft maintenance workers run the equipment they 
maintain. Work is organized into three basic areas: production 
(“operating attendant”), craft/maintenance (“process instrumentation”, 
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“process mechanic” and “process electrician”), and entry (“material 
handler”).  
 
Within this structure, promotion ladders are flat and based on training, 
knowledge and skill. There are six skill levels for operators, five for 
maintenance workers and three for material handlers. Promotion to 
fully qualified status (and hence maximum earnings potential) is not 
impeded by the structure of career ladders and availability of openings 
higher-up. Every employee is expected to advance to fully qualified 
status. This serves to reduce class distinctions and barriers by 
permitting and encouraging each employee to reach his or her 
maximum potential. Initially, promotion was largely tenure-based; 
however, as the system matured, promotion based on skill and 
knowledge became the norm. Material handlers can progress to 
operator positions as openings become available. However, though 
theoretically possible, material handlers and operators rarely progress 
to craft maintenance positions which require specific skills. 
 
3.3.3.5. Decision-making 
 
Every level of decision-making at I/N involves input from a blend of 
bargaining unit and management personnel, from the shop floor teams 
to the Joint Advisory Council (JAC). Decisions are made by 
consensus, meaning that each worker and manager present their ideas 
and suggestions which carry equal weight in joint decision-making. 
Provision of information linking individual with organizational 
performance facilitates the union of common fulfilment of interests 
and objectives of all participants in productive operations, whether 
they be labor, management or staff, and helps to promote 
labor/management cooperation and teamwork. It also fosters 
commitment to the organization. By providing vehicles for self-
expression and involvement in various aspects of the business, it 
promotes internal communication and resolution of problems as they 
arise. 
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According to I/N’s retired president, John Selky, a critical component 
of the I/N work system involves employee authority to make decisions 
affecting I/N’s daily operations, reinforced by other institutional 
supports:  
 
 “You must give people accountability and responsibility to do 
their job at the level they’re at whether they are an engineer or a 
blue collar worker. And then, you must have other systems to 
support it. You have to have the security system support it and 
have the incentive pay system support it” (personal interview, 4 
December 1999). 
 
The degree of autonomy afforded bargaining unit production 
employees over production decisions is significant. There are no 
white collar employees and managers present during second and third 
shift or on the week-ends. Sixteen of the twenty one shifts are 
managed by the workforce without supervision, although employees 
can always consult engineers and other resources by phone. 
Reflecting on the degree of autonomy and hinting at the feeling that 
this is changing under new ownership, one bargaining unit team 
member said: “It felt like a career, not a job…..We ran the plant.” 
(Personal interview, 21 September 1998). This particular employee 
had worked at Inland for many years prior to working at Tek and 
Kote, and was profoundly energized by the transition to a new form of 
work stressing employee input and autonomy: “For me, it was always 
what I thought work should be about.” (Personal interview, 19 
October 1998).  
 
3.3.3.6. Team working 
 
At I/N, responsibility and control over the entire process is assigned to 
self-directed autonomous work teams which share responsibility with 
management for the production process, training and the acquisition 
of necessary skills. Team assignments are made by teams and based 
on knowledge, skill and minimization of disruption. At I/N, teams are 
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responsible for products from beginning to end of the process. At Tek, 
because there is one basic product that varies in specifications, 
fabricated in a continuous process, the team consists of all 30 people 
operating each shift. Because this size is large, there has been 
continuing experimentation with alternative methods of coordinating 
work and team performance. At Kote, the two galvanizing lines are 
run by teams of seven to eight persons each, on each work shift. 
 
3.3.3.7. Training 
 
Training at I/N is influenced by the Japanese philosophy that “training 
is a way of life and a daily part of every job” (Magnum, Kim and 
TalIman 1996: 14). The Japanese term “kaizen” (continuous 
improvement) is well known to plant members. All training is on 
company time. I/N employees receive technical training as well as 
intensive training in math, chemistry and computer programming. All 
employees start at the bottom and advance through a process of skill 
by skill certification. Employees are also trained in social skills 
including teamwork, team building dispute resolution and 
communication, with teams scheduled off the line at least one day per 
month for team building activities at Kote (but not at Tek); and this 
was soon reduced to four hours.  
 
In short, broad and extensive training in technical and computer skills, 
coupled with training in social and business skills, equip workers with 
the knowledge necessary for assuming responsibility beyond the 
technical requirements of their jobs. Such training also provides the 
labor force with transferable skills and expertise which are marketable 
in the external labor market, lowering the personal risks associated 
with a new labor market system like I/N’s and consequently 
improving the likelihood of effective internal labor market 
cooperation and flexible job behavior. 
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The training culture permeates the I/N work system from top to 
bottom. According to Selky and ex-financial controller and CFO 
Freeland: 
 
“You have the responsibility to let them know what their job 
entails. I think that’s the crux of the whole thing. You have to be 
able to say: these are the people we invest in; and before we turn 
the first machine on, the first motor on, we invested a lot of 
money in these folks up-front. As you invest in them, let them 
know that you’re investing in them.” (Selky, personal interview, 
4 December 1998). 
 
I think the key is being a perpetual, professional student. You 
have to have a work force that is continually learning and 
continually training….this is the key to managing change and to 
success. We did an unbelievable amount of training. We brought 
the core group in a year before we even started up – for no other 
purpose than training and developing our unique culture. They 
certainly weren’t adding any “value” at that point, because they 
weren’t producing any products." (Freeland, personal interview 
15 December 1998). 
 
3.3.3.8. Compensation 
 
The compensation system, too, was designed to more closely unite 
labor and management. The compensation structure is a pay for 
knowledge system where workers progress from one skill-based 
classification to the next based on a series of training steps, defined by 
skill classification levels. During the first year of training, before the 
plant started operation, all employees at I/N were paid on a salary 
basis every two weeks. Currently (1998), all workers are guaranteed a 
40 hour week, with wages for material handlers ranging from $9.92 to 
$12.15 per hour (three skill compensation levels) (6.20 to 7.60 
pounds). Operators’ wages range from $14.37 to $17.16 per hour (six 
skill compensation levels) (8.98 to 10.73 pounds); and maintenance 
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employees’ (process mechanics, process electricians and process 
instrumentation) wages range from $14.94 to $17.16 per hour (five 
skill compensation levels) (9.34 to 10.73 pounds). (Agreement 
between I/N Tek and I/N Kote and USWA, 29 September 1996). 
Annual income levels are high by local and industry standards 
because of a high performance based incentive plan. On average, 
Tek/Kote bargaining unit members earn over $60,000 (37,500 
pounds) annually (including bonuses). Performance bonuses are based 
on operating level (operating hours/scheduled hours); quality 
(rejections/output; customer complaints/output); efficiency (tons per 
hour/target or theoretical tons per hour); cost (defined by the JAC)). 
Quarterly bonuses are equally shared by all employees regardless of 
position in the hourly work-force and are based largely on measures 
of output and quality. Early in the learning curve, these payments 
were $2,000 to $3,000 (1250 to 1875 pounds) per quarter. Soon after, 
quarterly bonuses began to average $4,000 (2500 pounds) per quarter 
or $16,000 (10,000 pounds) per year (Selky and Freeland interview, 4 
December 1998; Magnum et. al., 1996). 
 
The compensation system plays a central role in supporting the I/N 
work system. According to I/N president, Selky, “If you are going to 
tell them they’re responsible for quality then you better pay them for 
good quality and not pay them for tons of any quality” (personal 
interview, 4 December 1998). The bonus system has proved to be 
central to the idea of paying for quality. According a local union 
official, in the beginning, the bonus was seen as too generous.  
 
“John wasn’t sure that he wasn’t throwing a whole lot of money 
at a pie in the sky idea – I said, John, you recruited those people, 
you know the intellect, you know the caliber, if you reward them 
handsomely they won’t disappoint you. And they didn’t. We set 
two world’s records.” [The compensation system] continues to 
drive the plant. (personal interview, 12 February 1999). 
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Within two years it was evident to all employees that the bonus 
system did in fact pay. Commenting on the friction in an initial 
arbitration round over the bonus and his later pleasure at being proven 
too sceptical about the timing and amount of the bonus, Selky said:  
 
‘Our 1987 pre-startup agreement introduced the concept of a 
quarterly bonus plan to begin after [emphasis added] the plant 
reached ‘steady state.’ In retrospect, if we had not introduced the 
bonus immediately at startup in 1990 and then allowed the plan 
to pay progressively more money along the learning curve, we 
would have taken much longer to reach steady state.’ (personal 
interview, 18 July 1999). 
  
3.3.3.9. Labor relations 
 
For most of the 1990s, the labor relations environment of I/N could be 
characterized by a high degree of trust and mutual respect. Workers at 
I/N are represented by the USWA. However, the I/N local union 
operates independently from that at Inland’s Indiana Harbor Works 
and negotiates a separate contract tailored to the specific needs and 
progressive labor market system of the new facility. The union 
participates in the company’s joint governance structure and plays a 
key role in reinforcing team autonomy in production.  
 
Good labor relations at I/N did not automatically materialize. Both 
labor and management had to learn how to relate to each other 
differently because the core labor and managerial force came from the 
traditional labor relations environment at the Indiana Harbor Works. 
The learning process involved training and was reinforced by 
experience in the joint implementation of the I/N work system - from 
the development of its mission statement and statement on values 
through weathering the challenges of the learning curve process 
following start-up. The behavior of various actors and their implicit 
and explicit commitment to each other and the venture provided a 
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foundation for solving future problems. Employment security clauses 
helped to bolster these commitments.  
 
Management’s respect for the union’s position on key issues, and vice 
versa, facilitated this process. For example, management initially 
wanted to make use of “buffer” contract workers (mimicking Japanese 
work systems) but acquiesced to the union’s opposition. The union, in 
turn, allowed management to create an internal class of employees 
called material handlers whose pay was significantly less than those 
of other bargaining unit members. Management and the union 
consistently opted to give employees responsibility and autonomy. 
There was an early decision not to put turn foremen on the floor. In 
contract negotiations along the way, management and union members 
often had substantive differences, but were usually able to resolve 
them without the use of an arbitrator.  
 
Both management and bargaining unit members went through stages 
where their commitment to stated intentions and plans was tested. For 
example, when the initial Japanese training team returned to Japan to 
settle visa problems, it soon became apparent that the Japanese 
trainers had been too often stepping in to operate the equipment and to 
fix problems themselves, rather than training employees. As a result, 
when the Japanese team returned they were told to try harder to advise 
and train, and not to take over when problems arose. In response, the 
Japanese (who had originally lobbied strongly for turn foremen but 
were turned down by the American JAC) now began to question the 
wisdom of this decision. JAC members again decided against turn 
supervisors but agreed to station engineers on the floor for a few 
weeks, only as a resource. During this time, workers were allowed to 
learn and to make mistakes. According to Selky, “At that time ... we 
had a number of strip breaks in the furnace which were very costly ... 
but gradually people learned how to react - it just took time.” 
(personal interview, 4 December 1998). This kind of common sense 
faith, both in and between I/N management and employees was 
pivotal in creating a high trust, functional work culture.  
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Evidence of the positive labor relations environment could be found 
in the high level of employee persistence. Quits and/or layoffs were 
virtually nonexistent until only recently. According to Selky and 
Freeland, during the first eight years of operation (1990-1997) only 
about five to ten people from labor and management left voluntarily. 
It was also noteworthy that only one bargaining unit employee was 
terminated for cause after an arbitration hearing failed to reinstate 
him. (personal interview, 4 December 1998).  
 
3.4. Sustaining the Work System 
 
Commitment to the I/N venture by local management and union 
members, high level officers from Inland and Nippon Steel, I/N 
suppliers and customers, and the local community helped to ensure its 
successful start-up and implementation of its functional work system. 
Because of this, I/N overcame initial resistance and the inevitable 
crises and pressures experienced during the startup and 
implementation phases of a new operation. However, ensuring longer-
term success was a much more difficult task. The following section 
documents some of the ways in which institutionalization of the I/N 
work system was attempted and vulnerabilities were exposed as the 
Tek and Kote work system evolved within its particular context.   
 
3.4.1. Insulation from internal and external pressures 
 
One of the primary strategic approaches taken by I/N decision-makers 
was to direct the focus of productive agents on particular jobs and to 
assign them the authority and autonomy to accomplish their required 
tasks without distraction. For production employees, the objective was 
to produce high quality flat rolled steel efficiently; it was not to worry 
about how Inland’s stock price was doing, or how Inland's Indiana 
Harbor Works employees felt about the I/N venture. According to 
local management and union representatives, the “willy nilly of the 
world” in many instances was a distraction for production employees; 
and it was management’s responsibility to insulate employees from 
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unimportant “noise.” Therefore, while management gave employees 
significant autonomy over production and work system decisions, 
there was explicit acknowledgment by all parties involved that 
managing I/N’s external environment by top-level plant managers was 
critical to making employees effective at the production level. 
 
This insulating process is illustrated by a “structural systems” 
diagram, “the cable,” used by I/N management early-on in the process 
which pictures strategic and management levels insulating the core 
operating system, the level at which productive inputs are combined 
to produce quality output. At the strategic level, responsibilities 
included “relating the environment to the organization” and 
“providing business direction;” at the management level, 
responsibilities included “managing the forces for change against the 
forces for stability” and “designing information and decision making 
systems.” Using this framework, top-level plant management would 
take actions at the strategic level to allow lower level employees the 
autonomy and responsibility to keep the core operating system 
running smoothly.  
 
This approach depends upon committed decision-makers who 
understand the work system and are able to distinguish what to do and 
when. Under Selky's leadership, the system worked effectively. This 
was in part due to I/N's managerial structure with direct internal lines 
of authority to the plant president and then to the corporate Chief 
Operating Officer. The Human Resources (HR) Manager, for 
example, reported directly to the plant president, Selky, who himself 
was an officer of Inland Steel Company, reporting directly to the 
president. As a result, I/N's interests were represented directly to top 
corporate leadership. This served to protect the core operating system 
from pressures generated by the possible divergence of interests 
between I/N and the Indiana Harbor Works that might subordinate 
I/N's interests to those of the steel company.  
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The Indiana Harbor Works has always been a dominant influence in 
Tek/Kote’s external environment; and a consistent theme in the 
relationship has traditionally revolved around costs. When Inland’s 
profits sag, for example, pressure mounts to cut measurable costs 
wherever in the corporation they can be found - not only at the Harbor 
Works but also at I/N. Until only recently, however, I/N was relatively 
protected from corporate cost-cutting measures. The recent ownership 
change, coupled with an unprecedented flood of cheap imports in 
1998, has put managers under more pressure to cut costs than ever 
before.  
 
Pressures relating to costs and originating in the social relations of 
production at the corporate level began during startup, when Inland 
faced financial difficulties and the I/N facility was expensive. As a 
result, there was a lot of criticism directed at the venture, with 
Inland’s Indiana Harbor Works bargaining unit and first level 
management employees assigning blame to I/N for Inland’s 
performance problems. At the time, Selky, the plant president, Dennis 
Freeland, the controller, and other executives and managers were 
often put in the position of having to resolutely defend the plants and 
to soften negativity of the Harbor Works employees so that I/N 
employees would not become demoralized. However, Selky’s position 
as an officer of Inland reporting directly to the corporation’s president 
gave him added clout. This allowed I/N employees to feel relatively 
confident that their interests were being represented and supported.   
 
The I/N operating system was also insulated from external pressures 
by a supply agreement with Inland stipulating that steel supplied to 
I/N would only be from Inland. Operating finds were also provided by 
Inland based on the Inland Nippon Steel Partnership Agreement. 
During the start-up phases of operation, when bugs were worked out 
of the system, mistakes were made and learning took place, these 
financial arrangements protected the new facility from competitive 
market pressures. They also protected the facility in the event of 
catastrophic breakdown of equipment or any other such unforeseen 
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event that might impact costs. Through time, as I/N broke world 
records for efficiency and quality, doubts about its profitability were 
dispelled. Still, the financial arrangement with Inland was an 
important buffer against external market pressures during the period 
of time when the new work system was most vulnerable.  
 
The joint venture with Nippon Steel Corporation has also served to 
insulate the plant from certain external pressures, particularly those 
revolving around short-term costs. Nippon’s objective in the venture 
has traditionally been oriented towards assuring the production of 
consistently high quality steel at high volume. This is because the 
specifics of the financing arrangement are such that Nippon earns a 
return on their investment based on operating hours of the major 
production units, not cost cutting. This arrangement has at times put 
the two partners at odds with each other, because Inland’s profits from 
the joint venture are more closely linked to operating profit than are 
Nippon’s. Additionally, and partly because bonus payments to 
bargaining unit members are largely based on quality and the volume, 
Nippon and the union more often than not find themselves on similar 
sides of particular issues.  
 
NIPPON in general can be characterized as long-termist and 
interested in cooperatively solving problems relating to production 
and the work system; and initial members of management and the 
union clearly felt this influence. When asked during the 1980s 
whether what they saw at Nippon Steel’s Hirohata works could be 
replicated in the U.S., John Selky’s thoughts were:  
 
 “It’s going to be a question of the people because obviously 
[the Japanese] work differently….Japan’s steel industry had 
their last work stoppage in 1959 like American steel but after 
that the government, the union, and the corporations agreed to 
never have that kind of adversarial relationship develop where 
we would stop our operation. They didn’t really have company 
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unions but they sure had cooperative understandings and very 
open communication.” (personal interview, 4 December 1998). 
 
This understanding of indigenous Japanese work systems and labor 
relations combined with partnership with Nippon in the U.S. helped to 
guide employees towards more cooperative approaches. Commenting 
to a reporter in the early 1990’s, the I/N union president said:  
 
“The Japanese have been a good role model. We might 
traditionally nip at each other’s heels being union and 
management. The Japanese think things through and look at it 
from all different angles and they brainstorm on how to resolve 
an issue. That tends to rub off. I feel very lucky to be here. It’s 
new technology. It should give me a stable income. When I 
come to work, I have something to give. You can’t put a price 
on that feeling.” Paul Rausch (Cohen, 1990). 
 
Through time, Nippon has become less visible, due in part to 
problems in Japan during the long downturn and the gradual reduction 
of Japanese employees at the plants. However, Nippon’s influence 
still is important, and continues to influence decisions after the ISPAT 
buyout.  
 
3.4.2. External pressures and internal frictions 
 
As evident from the discussion above, tension between the Harbor 
Works and I/N has been apparent from the start, although at certain 
times it has been more submerged than at others. Much of this tension 
revolves around the fact that a clear vision of what the relationship 
would be was never articulated and then institutionalized. Financial 
projections that anticipated much higher prices for I/N products never 
materialized, and this made matters even more difficult. Ideas about 
what and how Inland and I/N would learn from each other were not 
consistent; and a clear consensus on the degree of autonomy that I/N 
should have from the Harbor Works has not emerged.  
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One of the main reasons for this lack of understanding may stem 
simply from the fact that high level executives and managers at the 
Indiana Harbor Works were not fully involved with and trained in the 
process of creating and operating a work system like the I/N joint 
venture. According to Selky, managers at the Harbor Works who did 
not participate in the startup process may not be able to identify with 
the new work culture or may not have the desire to make it succeed. 
(personal interview, 4 December 1998). In this scenario, plants 
become more dependent on particular individuals who must insulate 
them from the influence of an organization which does not fully 
understand what has been created “out there in the cornfields.” 
Finding managers from Inland to replace managers retiring from I/N 
also becomes problematic. 
 
Although I/N created a highly successful work system substantially 
different from past models, it has often seemed as though Inland was 
not interested in learning from the I/N experience, and in fact wanted 
to suppress it. Frequent management changes at the Harbor Works 
compounded problems. This inability to respect the original mission 
to create a new work culture and then to transmit lessons was 
frustrating to managers and employees at Tek and Kote. Freeland 
recalled that it was like:  
 
“We were commissioned by the king to go out and find new 
land and do missionary work and once we understood best in 
class practices … to share that information….well now we’re 
coming back, the king is dead, the entire leadership has changed, 
and they are saying “who are you?”” (personal interview, 15 
December 1998). 
 
Elaborating on the confusion caused by shifting leadership, Freeland 
said 
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“to me, that was one of the primary problems that we had. It was 
always changing… what we were. The finance people at the 
Harbor were always caught in that, where they wanted to report 
Tek and Kote results managerially, as if we were part of the steel 
company, but yet we were trying to operate discretely as a 
separate company, and it was always a conflict. And it was 
always a situation of “should we centralize, or should we not 
centralize, should you really have your separate finance 
department there, or should you be reporting back to Inland.” 
(personal interview, 15 December 1998). 
 
Confusion continues to this day, with the latest swing towards 
consolidation at the Indiana Harbor Works.  
 
These swings inevitably pressure the plants towards a more traditional 
work system. Reflecting on the rhetoric of the “new work system” and 
the reality of the pressure coming from the Harbor Works, one 
manager said: 
 
“They told us to go out there in the corn field and be different. 
They promised that to our employees. And then we turn around 
and we don’t walk the talk.” (personal interview, 17 March 
1999). 
  
Recalling a consultant’s comments before both plants were even 
started up, this manager also noted:  
 
“The consultant said ‘you need involvement from the highest 
levels of the company because when you go into something like 
this in a new venture, one of two things will happen…you’ll be 
the point of a wedge that will drive this work system back to the 
bigger company, or, sooner or later, they will send Attila the 
Hun out to stamp out the revolution.’ I reflect a lot on that in the 
last year, because a lot of the actions are to stamp out the 
revolution.” (personal interview, 17 March 1999). 
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In fact, developments at the highest levels of both managerial and 
union leadership throughout the 1990’s created pressures that appear 
to be pushing all players into more traditional directions. On the 
management side, turnover prior to the ISPAT takeover – both at 
Inland and at I/N – contributed to increased fragility of the work 
culture. Although I/N leadership was stable through the 1990s, 
leadership changes at Inland’s strategic level were relatively frequent, 
causing shifts in management philosophy that caused confusion, and 
often hard feelings on all sides. At the plant-level, with Selky's 
retirement in the spring of 1998, I/N was put in a vulnerable position, 
and replacing him was a difficult task. Selky was respected on all 
sides, and clearly had an ability to empathize with employee positions. 
A local union official said: “He’s one of the most level headed guys I 
know. Quite often we had much different approaches to similar issues, 
but I always respected him. He’s just a guy who is always straight 
up.” (personal interview, 16 November 1998). From the beginning, 
Selky was determined to create a steel plant with a fundamentally 
different work system - and with unionized employees.  
 
This is not to imply that the work culture was completely harmonious 
during Selky’s tenure. Problems did arise, and some of these problems 
caused substantial frustration. One such event occurred in 1993 when 
a small group of white-collar employees at I/N started an organizing 
drive. The resolute corporate campaign against the drive created 
disappointment on the union side. As a local union official put it:  
 
“Clearly [Inland leadership] said [to Selky]: You can not let that 
happen. These are all pressure tactics that notoriously anti-union 
companies use on their employees. And here I am sitting there 
thinking “which is it?” They’re going to all this trouble and 
spending all this money trying to bust up this little O and T 
[Office and Technical workers] organizing drive. And at the 
same time they want to go on TV and smile and shake my hand 
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and give me a plaque [because of our innovative labor relations 
environment].” (personal interview, 12 February 1999). 
 
Although this did not cause much visible turmoil, it did erode morale:  
 
“It wasn’t really much talked about – it was sort of a wink and a 
nod … well, you know, we gotta do what we gotta do, and you 
gotta do what you gotta do … and I would respond, yes, and you 
know I have to do what I have to do – the corporate game – but 
it was extremely disappointing.” (personal interview, 12 
February 1999). 
 
On the management side, there was frustration that O and T white-
collar employees were not satisfied with their wages despite the fact 
that they were relatively high by local standards. Here again, 
regardless of what Selky may have personally felt, pressure from 
Inland was intense to keep the bargaining unit members limited to 
production and maintenance employees.  
 
The current plant president of I/N is viewed by production employees 
as a more traditional type of manager, contributing to an erosion of 
trust and morale. This has been exacerbated by developments 
following the ISPAT takeover, which occurred soon after his 
appointment. Further, he is not an officer of Inland as Selky was; and 
he reports to a vice-president at Inland rather than to the president, 
reducing his influence and consequently his ability to effectively 
represent and protect the interests of I/N and its employees. 
 
On the union side, Lynn Williams’ recent retirement as president of 
the USWA and his replacement by George Becker has caused 
frustration among I/N management, who view Becker as a more 
traditional union leader, willing to “knock heads and bring 
management to their knees.” In contrast, Lynn Williams was a firm 
supporter of the type of work system created at I/N and a more 
cooperative approach to labor relations. Additionally, and analogous 
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to I/N management difficulties in selling the work system to Inland as 
leadership changed, the I/N local union leadership has faced mounting 
difficulty defending their approach, to both the local union at the 
Harbor Works and the international union.  
 
In short, although the I/N work system is remarkable in its 
achievement of cooperative labor relations, innovative work 
structures, management methods and human resource practices, it was 
not devoid of problems. Jointly solving some of these problems, 
especially those relating to I/N’s immediate task of producing high 
quality steel, strengthened the work culture. However, other problems, 
often stemming from external sources, served to weaken it. The 
failure to create a productive system totally autonomous from Inland 
meant that I/N remained vulnerable to strategic level decisions 
subordinating local interests to those of Inland corporate. This made it 
harder for I/N to create “deep roots” for the work system. Adding to 
this, the retirement of I/N’s president, John Selky; continually 
changing leadership from Inland; and the retirement of USWA 
president, Lynn Williams, put the labor relations of I/N under greater 
pressure. I/N’s roots are now being tested in a way that no one in the 
plant could have anticipated ten years ago.  
 
“It would be great if an orderly transition had happened, to see if 
those roots took hold and were healthy. But with a change in 
control in the acquisition, and the abrupt termination of some of 
the senior management people who had designed some of the 
original things, we’re not in a position to make this orderly 
transition and pass on some of the legacy and information. That 
complicates it – you’ve just changed all the players - it would 
have been nice to know what the alternative would have been, 
what would have happened had I had the ability to talk to a lot 
of people and mentor a lot of people; but that never happened. 
You’ll never know how the joint ventures would have 
matured..” (Dennis Freeland, Personal interview, 4 December 
1998). 
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Freeland and other senior managers were notified of their immediate 
termination on 31 July 1998. 
 
3.5. ISPAT’s Takeover: How Deep Are the Roots at I/N? 
 
During the mid- to late 1990s, Inland Steel’s performance was 
considered to be among the more stable in the industry, due in large 
part to the restructuring and technology investments that were made 
during Luersson’s tenure as CEO and with the aid of Nippon Steel’s 
financial and technological support. According to industry analysts in 
November 1997, “[Inland’s] income results [were] among the more 
stable in the integrated group, with profitability now having been 
recorded for four straight years” (Valueline, 7 November 1997, p. 
1400). However, it was also noted that, along with most other 
American steel companies, “despite the positive things now going on 
here, the stock is still accorded a low valuation by Wall Street” 
(Valueline, 7 November 1997, p. 1400). Because of its poorly 
performing stock, Inland’s top officers continued to search for ways 
to increase share prices. In the end, they concluded that Inland needed 
“to find a buyer” (Arndt, 18 March 1998). In 1996, Inland considered 
selling its steel-making operations to US Steel Corporation. In 
October 1997, Inland CEO Darnell got together with the CEO of 
ISPAT, a Dutch-owned conglomerate, head-quartered in London, and 
began to seriously discuss the idea of a possible sale. 
 
ISPAT had been attempting to buy an American steel company for 
more than a decade. In 1992, ISPAT made an unsuccessful attempt to 
buy Bethlehem Steel’s former Bar, Rock and Wire Division in 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania. However, the deal fell through when 
ISPAT and the USWA were unable to agree on a new contract. 
ISPAT also considered purchasing McLouth Steel in 1996. According 
to ISPAT CEO, Mittal, “Our strategy is to create a global steel 
company” (Chicago Tribune, 18 March 1998). With operations in 
India, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Canada, Germany, Ireland and 
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Kazakhstan, ISPAT had not yet secured a location in the United States 
but was determined to do so. 
 
On 16 July 1998, ISPAT International officially acquired Inland Steel 
Company, including its 60 percent share of Tek and 50 percent share 
in Kote, for $ 1.43 billion (900 million pounds).3 Nippon Steel still 
owns its 40 percent of Tek and 50 percent of Kote. According to a 
metallurgist recently laid off at the plant, the Japanese were informed 
of the buyout shortly before it was made public (personal interview, 7 
September 1998). Although Nippon initially debated what to do, an 
agreement by ISPAT and Nippon to continue the joint venture was 
announced on 6 July 1998. The Inland purchase represents ISPAT’s 
first move in the United States. Its stated plan is to use Inland as the 
headquarters for its North American steel holdings. 
 
Although the local 1010 union and the international union formally 
objected to the ISPAT buyout, they were unable to raise the capital to 
purchase and run Inland as an employee-owned company. As a result, 
they acquiesced to the deal but remain suspicious of “the axe-wielding 
Mittal, known for his brutal cost-cutting methods … [Inland] workers 
… felt that he would resort to extreme measures and reduce the 
workforce to a bare skeleton” (Manik 1998, p. 46.). Although Inland 
CEO, Darnell will continue serving as top corporate manager under 
the new ownership. ISPAT has a history of replacing top management 
with its own management team. 
 
ISPAT’s stated business model for Inland involves a 20 percent 
reduction in employment and costs and a 20 percent increase in 
output. Measurable cost cutting is central to ISPAT’s philosophy, and 
stems partly from a century old Indian “Partha” accounting practice, 
by which all costs are calculated at the end of each business day. “I 
tell all my managers that I expect Partha-style accounts each day. 
They say I am insane, but I tell them that’s what you have to do if you 
want to work for ISPAT” (Evans, 1997). 
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It is clear that reducing employment costs is one of ISPAT’s strategies 
for increasing competitiveness as there have been layoffs at many of 
its acquisitions. However, according to ISPAT, laying off employees 
is not the only strategy for reducing employment costs. As the Inland 
takeover became public in the spring of 1998, ISPAT’s Mittal 
addressed initial concerns and skepticism regarding ISPAT’s 
intentions by stating that “ISPAT doesn’t necessarily focus on 
reducing employment. It instead tries to increase volume to reduce 
employment costs … I haven’t reduced employment in Canada 
beyond our commitment to the union” (ISPAT, 1998). Nevertheless, 
once the acquisition of Inland was finalized, ISPAT immediately cut 
costs through management layoffs at Inland’s Indiana Harbor Works 
and I/N. In all, 300 managers and white collar staff were laid-off, 
representing a 17 percent reduction in the staff that is not under 
contract (Arndt 1998). The following is from a company press release 
on ISPAT’s web page: 
 
“ISPAT International N.v. also announced that the integration of 
recently acquired ISPAT Inland Inc. into the organization is 
making good progress, and to date has been realizing the 
synergies and cost reductions as per its business plan. For 
example, immediately after the acquisition of ISPAT Inland, 
there was a reduction in the non-unionized white-collar work 
force by 17%. Further, considerable progress has been made in 
realizing global purchasing synergies and to date, the Company 
has achieved more than 25% in annualized savings as compared 
to $120 million planned reduction over three years” (ISPAT 
International Company Press Release, 10 November 1998). 
 
While employment at Inland’s Indiana Harbor Works has been 
steadily reduced since 1980, this is only the second time in I/N’s 
history that anyone has been laid off. Having survived three down-
sizings at Inland,4 in 1997, prior to the ISPAT buy-out, 13 out of 195 
I/N employees (both Japanese and American) retired or were 
terminated; in 1998-9, 52 more positions were eliminated, 
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representing a reduction of approximately 33 percent. Already, the 
management down-sizing has been accomplished and decision-
making units at I/N have been centralized back or report to managers 
at the Indiana Harbor Works. Those units remaining at I/N have been 
stripped to a bare minimum as employees attempt to run the facility 
with 33% fewer managerial and staff positions. 
 
According to an I/N USWA official, unionized employees interpreted 
Ipat’s actions as a warning shot for what is to come this summer, 
when the collective bargaining contract is now up for re-negotiation. 
In his view, local management at the I/N facility, in the midst of a 
shift at the strategic level towards a cost cutting approach and fearful 
for their jobs due to initial white collar layoffs, will begin to 
“manage” by attempting to cut costs where they are most visible. 
Obvious, easily measurable possibilities include bargaining unit job 
cuts and/or significant wage concessions. This runs directly against 
the grain of the two prior agreements; both of which emphasize the 
importance of employment security and a generous compensation 
system for supporting the long-term viability of the work system. This 
low cost orientation is also fundamentally at odds with the 
requirements of a high performance, functional work system; and it is 
obvious that ISPAT’s cost cutting strategy has already eroded faith 
and trust among bargaining unit members. One bargaining unit 
employee said:  
 
“Cost per ton. Culture be dammed. Cost per ton. Everything … 
ISPAT is telling Inland and New Carlisle ... you buy pencils? I 
want you to reduce the cost of those pencils. Cost per ton of 
steel produced. Everything … Holders, pencils, light bulbs. 
And I don’t want to hear about culture and this is a good thing 
... this is warm and fuzzy. I want to know the cost per ton to do 
that. I don’t want to hear about people issues, or that’s not how 
we play ... in the perfect world, account for everything every 
day. At the close of the business day, your paper work should 
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account for every penny either generated, used, or paid out 
today” (personal interview, 12 February 1999). 
 
ISPAT is also rapidly centralizing authority and pulling control 
upward in the organization. An important example that has had a 
dramatic demoralizing effect on I/N employees relates to purchase 
orders. Prior to the ISPAT buy-out, bargaining unit employees had the 
authority to help select vendors and to make required purchases. As a 
result, a network of reliable supplier relationships was developed. 
When ISPAT took over, however, it removed this right from I/N 
employees and instead imposed its own purchasing system with the 
objective of locating the lowest cost suppliers on a global basis. 
Changes like these have significantly affected the I/N labor relations 
environment and employees’ attitudes towards the productive process 
as a whole. According to a bargaining unit employee, immediate cost 
currently overrides maintenance and quality concerns. Reflecting on 
the differences in maintenance since ISPAT’s takeover of Inland, he 
said:  
 
"So the focus that we had as an organization day to day on how 
do you do maintenance – what creates an effective maintenance 
program, is out the window. We’re living on our past 
glory…..We are shifting from a guaranteed availability of line 
time driving the maintenance organization to a very traditional 
run it till it breaks, glue it together, run it again until it breaks, 
don’t buy spare parts, don’t anticipate your needs…..let’s wing 
it" (personal interview, 12 February 1999). 
 
Since August 1998, radical changes in employment, working 
conditions, benefits, and reporting relations have been made. This 
process has been identified as “cherry picking” by I/N bargaining unit 
and management employees alike. In the words of one I/N manager, 
“Pieces of the work system are now being cherry picked. Pieces of it 
are being pulled out and re-centralized back to the Harbor” (personal 
interview, 17 March 1999). Speaking the same language, a bargaining 
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unit employee noted that the tree may not be able to survive the 
picking, especially when the cherries are actually the roots of the tree 
– roots which include labor-management trust, security, and autonomy 
for employees. I/N’s benefits package has been adjusted downwards 
to match the standard of the Indiana Harbor Works Plan. Pensions 
have been made portable to encourage early retirement and 
resignation of personnel. Reporting relations have been changed such 
that I/N section managers report to managers at Inland Steel Company 
rather than to top I/N management. Although still seemingly protected 
to a limited degree by its Japanese parent, Nippon Steel Corporation, 
conditions are changing rapidly at I/N and the work system is showing 
signs of deterioration into a more traditional form. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The I/N case demonstrates the benefits associated with functional 
work systems for the firm, its employees, the local economy in which 
it is embedded and the macro-economy. By providing stable 
employment, relatively high and stable incomes, high levels of 
training and skill development, good working conditions, employee 
autonomy and participation in the productive process, functional work 
systems lay a foundation for high and rising living standards. Based 
on a system of co-operation among productive agents and resources, 
they are efficient in helping the firm to meet and even exceed the 
demands of its product markets. Further, the long-term nature of 
production relationships within these systems provides a context in 
which the firm can focus on continually improving product and 
process quality and efficiency for long-run productive system success 
rather than on cost cutting and other strategies designed to maintain 
short-run profit margins. This case thus provides powerful evidence of 
the profitability and positive externalities generated by taking a high 
road approach to resolving product market pressures. 
 
Despite these positive outcomes, the I/N case also shows how fragile 
functional work systems are in the context of unregulated markets that 
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subject them to low road pressures. This is particularly true in markets 
with stock market based financial systems like that in the U.S.. Firms 
that choose to implement expensive, high wage functional work 
systems (the “high road”) must compete with low wage (“low road”) 
firms that ruthlessly cut costs in the short run. In this context, they 
may not be able to justify the costs if in the short run they are under-
priced by cost-cutting low road firms which at the same time look 
more attractive to shareholders. Given the American free-market, free 
trade orientation of recent years, many firms are racing to the bottom 
as they seek out the lowest possible labor costs globally. In the case of 
I/N, the recent acquisition by Ispat seems to represent a case of a high 
road plant being acquired by a low road firm. In this context, the 
lessons all too often flow in the wrong direction.  
 
In theory, stock market performance is assumed to reflect product 
market performance, however, this relationship is becoming less and 
less apparent, particularly from the perspective of the long-term. 
While product market success depends on production efficiency and 
organizational responsiveness to changes in technology and product 
market conditions, financial market success increasingly depends 
upon the maintenance of high and continually growing share values. 
Product market and stock market requirements diverge because stock 
market pressures often precipitate managerial strategies and 
approaches at the level of the productive system that undermine its 
ability to succeed in its product markets over the long term. If the 
firm’s shares are publically traded, its managers are under pressure to 
continually cut costs and restructure operations in an effort to generate 
growth in short run share values. This pressure forces them to focus 
on boosting short run share prices, inevitably setting off a downward 
spiral of measurable cost cutting and restructuring, most often 
directed at the most easily controlled costs: labour costs. The danger 
with this approach is that, continued long enough, it strips the 
productive system of the human resources and skills required for long 
term production effectiveness. In this context, there is also a tendency 
to engage in work restructuring that essentially intensifies the work 
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process, under the guise of such objectives as cooperation, 
empowerment and multi-skilling. This strategy often exhausts, 
discourages and disillusions the affected workforce, undermining the 
positive relationships and trust that had been built. As a result, the 
work system degenerates into a dysfunctional form. When short run 
cost cutting measures do not generate appreciably higher stock prices, 
more drastic measures are often taken, including selling the firm off if 
share prices remain depressed. Globalization augments the problem 
by pitting work systems - and by extension, local and national 
economies - into competition with each other, and setting off a race to 
the bottom that ends when the system reaches its lowest point - where 
labor costs and labor market conditions and standards are at a 
minimum, globally. This type of approach discourages innovation and 
undermines incentives for creating and sustaining co-operative work 
cultures that depend to an important degree upon environmental and 
institutional stability. Thus, regardless of how effective the internal 
labour market and work system are in helping the firm meet and/or 
exceed the requirements of its product markets, it is vulnerable to the 
damaging effects of stock market pressures and the responses they 
generate. 
 
Part of the problem, certainly, is the difference in the time horizons of 
the two markets (capital and product markets). Capital markets reward 
short term appreciation in share values; and capital moves quickly to 
the sources of greatest return. In contrast, product markets reward 
effective production and market performance, the long run success of 
which depends upon a long-term view of productive and market 
relationships. Long run productive efficiency requires continual 
investment in plant and equipment, provision of some minimal degree 
of employment and income security to maintain and develop requisite 
human resources, and the provision of training to maintain and 
develop the requisite skill base. It also requires the development of 
reliable supplier relationships to guarantee procurement of necessary 
productive resources and the establishment of consumer relationships 
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through effective channels of distribution and through the reliable 
provision of good quality goods and services at acceptable prices. 
 
Another problem relates to power imbalances among stakeholder 
groups at various levels of organization, shifts in those relationships 
and the failure of regulation to redress the imbalance. During the 
1970s, in a context of widespread industry crisis, there was a 
discernable shift in power away from trade unions and towards 
employers. This was a period in industrial history when bankruptcy 
and organizational failure rates were high and survival was the 
objective. In this context, corporate restructuring was driven by 
intensifying domestic and international competition and rapid 
technological change, and was characterized by efforts within firms to 
reduce costs and improve productive efficiency in order to meet 
competitive challenges (product market and technology).  
 
More recently, with intensifying pressure from stock markets, power 
has shifted away from employers’ ability to exercise internal control 
as they are increasingly subject to forces controlling them from the 
outside, primarily those of institutional shareholders whose objective 
is short run share value appreciation. This is generating another period 
of corporate restructuring, again aimed at reducing costs and 
improving efficiency. But the objective this time is not to improve the 
productive system’s economic and product market viability so much 
as it to generate a continuous series of short run improvements in its 
share value performance. The product market is thus no longer the 
primary source of pressure; dominant pressures now originate in the 
capital market. In this context, American company law (designed to 
promote share value maximization) serves to strengthen and protect 
the power of these outside controlling forces. In contrast to other 
systems, like Germany and Japan, American institutional shareholders 
are not socially or legally bound to the strategies and performance of 
companies for which they hold shares. They are therefore free from 
responsibility for the long-run fate of those companies, except to the 
degree that they have money invested in their shares.  
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The problem is further complicated by the inherent contradiction in 
the nature of stakeholder roles and objectives. Because workers (and 
managers) are also consumers and savers – and vice versa – their 
respective interests in those different roles are in opposition. As 
consumers, they want low prices, often achieved through price 
cutting, labour shedding and work intensification; as savers, their 
financial capital is held as equity in pension funds invested on the 
stock market, the managers of which are pursuing short-term gains. 
This adds to pressure to cut costs and restructure work in ways that 
are not in the interest of workers (and managers). This schizophrenia 
makes the identification and pursuit of stakeholder interests – other 
than those of owners / shareholders – increasingly problematic. 
 
In short, stock market based financial systems provide both incentives 
for and justification of corporate-level strategic decisions that 
generate short run shareholder profits but subordinate the interests of 
all other stakeholders to those of the shareholder. With deregulation, 
capital markets, product markets and labor markets (work systems) are 
becoming even more opposed. The problem confronting firms is how 
to resolve unremitting pressures from the stock market while at the 
same time meeting the requirements of their product markets for 
steadily improving product quality at competitive prices.  
 
As demonstrated by the I/N case, in national frameworks like the 
U.S., it is difficult for a firm to compete over the long term using a 
high road strategy. This is particularly true if it is subject to low road 
pressures and a stock market that rewards short term share value 
appreciation above all else. This difficulty is compounded by the 
absence of mechanisms or a forum for resolving the conflicts and 
divergent pressures and outcomes that are generated in such systems. 
This is in contrast with other national frameworks, where such 
mechanisms and forums do exist. In the German system, for example, 
there are thick institutional networks within which individual sets of 
relationships evolve and where divergent interests can be resolved in 
 45
mutually satisfactory ways; in the Japanese system, these difficulties 
are largely resolved by high standards of business ethics.  
 
The I/N case shows that there are important performance benefits and 
positive externalities associated with high road strategies and 
functional work systems. It is thus in the interest of stakeholders and 
the host economy to encourage their development and survival; and 
there is a need for regulation that protects and supports such systems, 
to promote the long run economic viability and performance of the 
productive system (local, national and global) as a whole. This 
regulation would include policy aimed at providing a supportive 
macro-economic context; stabilizing the firm’s financial environment; 
reducing the relative costs of functional work systems; and redressing 
the power differentials among markets and stakeholder groups. It 
would also include efforts to provide greater employment security by 
establishing a macroeconomic context that supports employment 
growth and provides unemployment protections so that job loss is not 
a catastrophic event. Regulation should also aim to develop and 
support effective forms of representation so that different stakeholder 
voices can be heard and divergent interests be resolved. Further, labor 
market and product market institutions should be developed to 
provide a supporting institutional framework within which competing 
pressures from various markets and other sources can be resolved. 
This would permit firms to operate both competitively and flexibly 
without forcing their involvement in the destructive downward 
processes that unregulated markets with low road pressures generate. 
 
The I/N case offers insight into the interrelationship between work 
systems, living standards and performance. It shows, clearly, that a 
high road approach and functional work systems positively impact 
stakeholders’ lives, improve production efficiency and benefit the 
local and macro-level economies and societies in which they are 
embedded. It is also evident that such work systems can be 
implemented in contexts with a history of adversarial labor-
management relations. However, the market system creates a situation 
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where firms’ commitments to stakeholder groups are increasing 
conditional, their commitment to employees, for example, being 
conditional on successful stock market performance and the work 
system effects of strategies designed to accomplish that end. As a 
result, maintain the foundational co-operative productive relationships 
becomes difficult. Further, because of the inherent contradiction 
between strategic approaches to maximizing stock market and product 
market success, these high road systems are fragile in national 
frameworks that subject them to low road pressures without a forum 
for resolving the difficulties that arise from opposing market pressures 
and responses. 
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APPENDICES
 
Appendix 1: The Indiana Harbor Works: The Inland Steel Flat 
Products Company and Inland Bar and Structural Company 
 
The Inland Steel Flat Products Company produces flat products 
which are cold rolled and coated for the automobile, appliance, office 
furniture and motor manufacturing industries. It operates within a 
modified, but largely traditional system. Since Inland’s steel making 
operations have historically been located at a single site, its labor 
force has never been divided into different plants, serving to facilitate 
collective bargaining within the company as well as the achievement 
of company-wide agreements on restructuring, the organization of 
work and relationships. Although resistance to change has come from 
both the labor force and management, Inland has aggressively pursued 
restructuring efforts involving extensive training programs for both 
labor and management, and involvement of both sides in the process 
of change. The result has been gradual movement away from the 
traditional steel industry system and toward a more flexible and 
participative one. Inland as a company leads the industry in this 
process. 
 
Inland Steel Bar Company:5 By the late 1970s, competition, primarily 
from the minimill sector with its ability to produce ever improving 
quality products at low cost, had eroded the profitability of Inland’s 
Bar and Structural Divisions, which represented 15% of Inland 
operations. In response, Inland decided to focus on the high quality 
segment of the Bar and Structural Products market. In order to 
compete with the minimills, it created the Inland Steel Bar Company 
as a separate business unit, with a certain degree of autonomy from 
the other divisions at the Indiana Harbor Works, although its labor 
force is represented by the same USWA local as the rest of the Harbor 
Works, and its management is Inland Steel Company management. It 
competes in the high quality end of the minimill sector market and 
with specialty steel producers, markets which require responsiveness 
to demand with products of consistently high quality and competitive 
price. 
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Inland invested $100 million in capital improvement and new 
technologies for the new company and embarked on a major 
retraining program. Progress was impeded by strong union resistance 
due to fear of losing jobs and a history of mutual labor/management 
antagonism, lack of respect and distrust; a skeptical labor force 
because of the company’s historical failure to deliver promises of 
‘employee empowerment;’ and management resistance to changes 
which undermined traditional sources of personal power. Despite this 
resistance, the union and company eventually negotiated an agreement 
which called for skill - based pay, self - directed work teams and labor 
force empowerment.’ This agreement represented a radical departure 
from the traditional way of doing things at Inland Steel Company, as 
well as a departure from the way things are done at the Inland Flat 
Products Company, which continues to operate within a system that 
involves job - based pay; narrowly defined jobs and rigid seniority 
units; limited worker responsibility and tight supervision. Although 
still in the early stages of development, the Inland Bar and Structural 
Company is making progress toward achieving the objectives of its 
foundational labor/management agreement. 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of Inland’s three operating units. 
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igure 1: Firm - Level Diversity at Inland Steel Company 
 Inland Steel Flat Inland Steel Bar  I/N Tek / I/N Kote 
 Products Company Company 
  
Ownership US: 
 US: 
 US and Japanese: 
Structure: Inland Steel Company Inland Steel Company Inland and Nippon 
 
Organizational Centralized Authority Decentralized Authority Decentralized Authority 
Structure: No Autonomy Company Autonomy Plant Autonomy 
 
Products: Flat Products Special Quality Bar, Alloy Highest Possible Quality 
  Bar, Engineered Bar and Cold-Rolled and Coated 
  Shaped Products Sheet 
Consumers: I/N Tek, Automobile,  I/N Kote, Automobile, 
 Appliance, Office  Appliance and Office  
 Furniture and Motor  Furniture Industries 
 Manufacturing Industries 
 
Technology: Modernized, Traditional Modernized Minimill / State-of-the-Art 
 Integrated Technology: Specialty Technology: Continuous Cold Rolling 
 Blast Furnaces, Oxygen Electric Arc Furnaces, and Finishing Process; 
 Furnaces, Continuous Continuous Casters, State-of-the-Art 
 Casters, Rolling and Rolling and Finishing Galvanizing and Coating 
 Finishing Mills Processes Processes 
 
Managerial  Flattened but Traditional Flat Managerial Structure Flat Managerial Structure 
Hierarchy: Managerial Structure 
 Direct Supervision: Reduced but Extensive Limited: 'Resources' None: 'Resources' 
 Control over Management Control Joint Management and and consultants 
 Process:  Labor Control (Mgmt Joint Labor Force and 
  Supercedes Labor) Management Control  
   (Team Shared w/ Mgmt) 
Organization Traditional, Rigid Job Flexible Job Strutures Flexible Job Structures 
of Work: Structures 
 Job Structures: Fragmented Job  Self - Directed Work  Self - Directed Work 
 Structures Teams Teams 
 Job Classifications: Extensive  Few  5 Classifications 
 Job Descriptions: Written Job Descriptions Written Job Descriptions  No Written Descriptions 
    (at first) 
 Participation: Little Partipation / Participation /  Participation /  
  Cooperation in Labor Cooperation in Labor  Cooperation a Critical  
  Process (but better  Process is being Feature of Labor  
  than industry average) Developed Process 
 
Compensation: Hourly; Job-based Hourly; Skill-based  Hourly with Incentive  
   Bonus; Skill-based  
 
Empt Security: None None Explicit Empt Security 
 
IR System: Adversarial Improving; Less Nonadversarial;  
  Adversarial Cooperative 
 Union: USWA 1010 USWA 1010 USWA 9231 
 Work Rules: Written  Written  No Written Work Rules 
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Appendix 2  
 
Vision Statement: Principle Change in Work Culture:  
 
Management’s view of work must be that work is not simply a job 
or a collection of jobs but rather a system in which people come 
together with a technology, in which disciplines are integrated to 
produce a product, and in which work can be designed both to 
optimize the best of the technology and to elicit significant 
contributions from people. In an integrated work system, all design 
elements reinforce each other and send similar and consistent 
messages to employees. Orientation and initiation programs, job 
definitions, recognition and reward systems, performance appraisal 
methods, training opportunities, communication systems and the 
information they provide, organizational structure, work 
rules/company policies and how they are made/enforced, 
management’s role and modeling by key executives — all of these 
elements of the system reinforce the notion that each employee is 
highly valued as an asset and that individual performance is central 
to the success of the business. This is what it means to create a work 
culture. 
 
(Management’s collective statement on the new work culture at 
I/N Tek, in 1988) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Vision Statement: Reflecting on 25 Years at I/N Tek  
 
Today is my last day at work (year 2,015), the day I retire from I/N 
Tek in New Carlisle, IN. I’ve put in 25 of the most rewarding years 
of my life. It seems almost like yesterday when my new life and a 
new cold strip were born. I also remember the old dark days when I 
worked at the Indiana Harbor Works, and worked just for a 
paycheck. 
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Today I get to walk around and say “good-bye” to all my friends, 
and take a last look at that trend setting cold mill of the 1990’s. You 
know it’s just as bright and clean as the day we produced our first 
coil. A lot of changes have taken place since then; a new galvanize 
and paint line integrated into the flow line, and the new city of I/N 
Tek, Indiana. 
 
I also leave with a great sense of accomplishment and proud feelings 
in my heart thinking about our record start-up and the year after year 
production record breakers we’ve had. But most of all, proud of how 
I helped to make this pioneering mill the envy of the American Steel 
Industry and of the World. The success not being derived from just 
technology, but from the supreme blend of technology and people. 
People working systems that let people really work together to their 
utmost potential. But I really feel great about how we at I/N Tek and 
other pioneering people-oriented companies started a wave of 
change in the American manufacturing base and help America 
achieve the pursuit of happiness. How we showed everybody else 
how super productive a company can be and how happy its workers 
can be. 
 
Well it’s time to go home now. I leave with a happy heart and a 
happy wallet. Good-bye everybody! Good-bye I/N Tek! 
 
 (Vision statement in 1988 before startup by Dan Narozny - team 
member) 
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Notes 
 
1. New workforce techniques have been referred to in the literature 
by a variety of terms including “high performance”, “high road”, 
“cooperative”, “functional”, etc. In this paper, to simplify the 
analysis, such work systems will be termed “functional”. 
 
2. The American steel industry is composed of three distinct 
sectors: the integrated sector, the specialty steel sector and the 
minimill sector. The integrated sector is the best known and by 
far the largest of the three, accounting for approximately 65 
percent of domestic steel production. The term ‘integrated’ 
refers to the fact that firms in this sector are involved in every 
aspect of steel making - from the preparation of iron ore, 
limestone and coal to be melted down in a blast furnace, to the 
production of final steel products in the rolling and finishing 
mills. Specialty steel mills account for approximately 7 percent 
of domestic production. These mills produce specialized steel 
products using high quality steel alloys using a more labor-
intensive, low volume production process than in either the 
integrated or minimills sectors. Minimill steel firms are ‘non-
integrated’ steel firms which use scrap steel as their main input; 
scrap is melted down in electric arc furnaces, continuously cast 
into semifinished shapes and rolled into finished steel products. 
Their technological configuration allows them to achieve 
economies of scale at much lower levels of output than their 
integrated counterparts. The average annual capacity of a 
minimill is approximately 400,000 tons of raw steel, compared 
with approximately 3 million tons in a typical integrated facility. 
 
3. The completed transaction value (approximately $1.4 billion) 
included $650 million for the common stock of Inland Steel 
Company; $238 million for the preferred stock of Inland Steel 
Company (ISC) held by ISPAT International (ISI); repayment of 
the inter-company debt of ISC owed to ISI, of approximately 
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$243 million; and assumption of debt owed to third parties of 
approximately $267 million. ISPAT raised a total of $1.1 billion 
in debt to finance this acquisition. Of this debt, $700 million was 
raised by ISC, comprising two senior secured term loan facilities 
each of $350 million, with a final maturity of seven and eight 
years respectively. ISPAT Sidbec Inc. raised the remaining 
amount of $400 million of this debt, electing to treat the 
transaction for tax purposes as an asset purchase under section 
338(h) (10) of the Internal Revenue Code, which is expected to 
provide an estimated tax benefit of approximately $100 million 
on a net present value basis. 
 
4. Inland’s Indiana Harbor Work’s employment went from 25,000 
in 1979; to 16,000-17,000 in the mid-1980s; to less than 9,000 
in 1998. 
 
5. Much of the information about the Inland Bar and Structural 
Company is drawn from Wilgus, 1991. 
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